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The Definition of Insurance: Implications for a Health 
Insurance Demand Model 
Mark J. 8rowne* 
Abstract 
This paper uses data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditures Survey to 
evaluate five different measures of insurance: a family's expected out-of-pocket pay-
ment for medical care, the expected value of the indemnity (fee-for-service) benefits 
from an insurance policy for a family, the percentage of the expected loss that the 
insured pays, the policy premium, and the policy limit of coverage. 
The study provides information that can help us understand whose insurance cov-
erage will change significantly as a result of health care reform. For example, it 
shows that those with low income (such as minorities, families headed by females, 
and unmarried individuals) on average purchase low amounts of health insurance. 
These groups would benefit considerably if health care reform institutes universal cov-
erage. Conversely, whites, families headed by males, married individuals, and those 
with high incomes on average have considerable health insurance coverage. 
Key words: measures oj insurance, out-oj-pocket expenses, indemnity beneJits 
1 Introduction 
Several different measures of insurance have been used by 
researchers to quantify a family'S level of insurance coverage. This 
paper compares five different measures of insurance coverage using 
group insurance data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey.1 The measures that are used in this study were 
chosen because they have been used by other researchers to develop 
• Mark J. Browne is an assistant professor of risk management and insurance at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received his Ph.D. from the Wharton School of 
the University of Pennsylvania in 1989. He currently is a member of the American Risk 
and Insurance Association, the American Economics Association, the Western Risk and 
Insurance Association, and the Risk Theory Seminar. 
1 The National Medical Care Expenditures Survey was conducted during 1977 and 1978. 
Data were collected from approximately 14,000 randomly chosen households through-
out the United States. The richness of this data set allows the construction of the five 
measures of insurance used in this study. Although this data set is now 16 years old, it 
is the most current public data set available containing all of the necessary data for 
this study. 
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equations to predict (forecast) the demand for medical insurance. 
Researchers have found that medical insurance demand equations 
(estimated using the different measures of insurance as the dependent 
variable) differ significantly in terms of the amount of variation 
explained. In addition, the statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables used in the models differs across models. Further, the esti-
mated income elasticities2 of the models vary widely. 
Since the data for this study were collected, the health insurance 
industry has undergone dramatic change. Health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs) have captured a significant portion of the insurance 
market. Similarly, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have 
grown rapidly in number and size. Managed care has become an 
increasingly important means of controlling health care costs. Insurers 
have moved from merely providing health care financing to an inte-
gral involvement in health care delivery. Insurers now regularly 
review the appropriateness of medical care prior to agreeing to pay 
for it.3 
More profound changes are expected in the future as leaders in 
both political parties push for reform in health care financing and 
health care delivery. Among the measures currently being discussed 
is a prohibition on most types of underwriting and a requirement that 
employers purchase health insurance for all employees, including 
those who work only part time. Mandatory purchase of health insur-
ance coupled with community rating would alter the consumption of 
health insurance greatly. The health insurance market today pro-
vides a myriad of different products that reflect individual and 
group preferences. Depending on the form of health care reform 
enacted, if any, individual choice in the market may be reduced sig-
nificantly. 
The current study provides extensive information on the types of 
health insurance persons demand in the absence of a government 
mandate that everyone has insurance. The study focuses on tradi-
tional indemnity (fee-for-service) insurance. A major advantage of 
indemnity insurance is that it does not restrict the insured's choice of 
provider. President Clinton's proposal calls for the formation of 
health alliances and for each health alliance to offer a choice of at 
2 Income elasticity is the ratio of the proportionate change in consumption of a good 
relative to a proportionate change in income, with prices held constant. 
3 The data used for this study preclude an analysis of policies that incorporate man-
aged care. Managed care may increase or decrease the value of an insurance contract to 
an insured. Managed care programs that limit an insured's ability to collect indemnifi-
cation benefits will reduce the policy's value to the insured. Programs that contribute 
to the insured receiving the best possible care provide enhanced value. 
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least one indemnity insurance policy and one HMO policy. While 
HMOs and PPOs have grown considerably during the last 20 years, 
indemnity insurance continues to dominate the market. 
The different ways to measure health insurance discussed in this 
study provide insights into what it means to have health insurance 
coverage. Depending on the definition one uses to assess health insur-
ance coverage, a particular policy may be perceived to provide either 
sufficient or insufficient coverage. The demand analysis provides sig-
nificant insight into the perceived value of health insurance to vari-
ous demographic groups. The findings in this study provide valuable 
information for policy/decision makers and for health insurance 
industry professionals. 
2 The Measures of Insurance 
There are two factors that make insurance particularly difficult 
to quantify. First, insurance is purchased through an aleatory con-
tract, which means that the payoff from the policy is uncertain and 
subject to events in the future that mayor may not occur. Second, the 
probability that an insurance contract actually will pay an indem-
nity benefit to an insured will depend upon the risk characteristics of 
the insured as well as the provisions of the insurance contract. 
Suppose an insurer sells identical policies (for the same price) to two 
individuals whom it believes to be similar risks. It follows that the 
insured who in fact is a greater risk will realize greater expected 
benefit from the insurance. This occurs because the insurer assumes 
more risk from the individual who is a higher risk than from the 
individual who is a lower risk. 
Before introducing the definitions of the various measures of 
insurance, it is important to give an example of one model of an 
insurance policy. Let Lij be the actual medical expenses incurred by 
insured i for medical service j and Bij be the actual indemnity benefit 
paid by the insurer out of the Lij expense. Then individual i's actual 
out-of-pocket expense for service j is 
OOPij = Lij - Bij. (1) 
The actual form of Bij depends on the specifics of the insurance 
policy. For example, if there is a deductible of dij' a coinsurance per-
centage4 of 100aij% (0 ::;; aij ::;; 1), and an amount Mij beyond which the 
insurance company pays for the entire excess loss, then Bij is given as: 
4 The coinsurance percentage of 100 ai/fo is paid by the insured. Thus if aij is equal to 
0.2, then the coinsurance percentage is 20 percent (100 x 0.2%). 
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{
o if Lij :::; dij 
Bij = (1-aij)(Lij-d ij) if dij < Lij :::; Mij 
(1-aij)(Mij-dij) + (Lij-Mij) if Lij > Mij. 
For many health plans, the deductibles and coinsurance payments 
are applied to the insured's total annual expenses. So, let N be the 
number of different types of medical services provided, and let Li and 
Bi be the aggregate medical expenses and indemnity benefits, respec-
tively. These aggregates are given by: 
o 
where di, 100atio (0 ::;; aij ::;; I), and M i are insured i's annual 
deductible, coinsurance percentage, and the amount beyond which the 
insurance company pays for all excess losses. 
Some plans may have an upper limit on the annual losses that 
will be paid, while others may have lifetime limits on the family's 
medical expenses. Some plans offer deductibles that must apply to 
each family member, in addition to an entire family deductible. 
They also may have deductibles and co-payments that vary with the 
medical provider utilized. For example, a certain group of physicians 
may have negotiated with the plan to supply services under this 
plan at an agreed set of charges. If an insured uses one of these 
physicians, the deductibles and coinsurance payments are usually 
lower, and the upper limit M may be lower. Regardless of the type 
of plan, one easily can obtain accurate estimates of an individual's 
expected losses. Given the myriad of different health insurance 
plans, however, it is not possible to give one equation for Bij or Bi. In 
addition, for all but the very simplest of plans, the mathematical 
form of the expected value of Bi or Bij will be complicated. 
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Note: The approach used in this paper to yield expected out-of-
pocket expenses and expected indemnity benefits is to apply the 
plan's benefit formula to the expected losses. This is equivalent to 
using the approximation E[g(X)] ~ g(E[X]) where g is a continuous 
function and X is a real-valued random variable. This approximation 
is exact if and only if g is a linear function of X. 
It must be pointed out that the medical services used in this 
study include outpatient physician costs, inpatient surgeon fees, hos-
pital room and board changes, fees for diagnostic tests, prescription 
medicine expense, and inpatient physician visits charges. Examples 
of medical expenses not included in the study include home health 
services, treatment in an extended care facility, and hospice care. 
The premium and claim data were collected over an 18 month period 
during 1977 and 1978. 
Sections 2.1 through 2.5 contain a description of the five mea-
sures. 
2.1 Expected Out-of-Pocket Payments For Medical Care 
(/1) 
The measure I1i is defined as: 
where N is the number of different medical services included in the 
definition and E[OOPijl is the expected out-of-pocket expense for the 
jlh medical service for insured i, as defined in equation (1). 
Several authors have used this measure. For example, Farley 
(1985) used it in her study of underinsurance in the United States, 
while Francis (1984) also used it in his evaluation of health 
insurance policies made available to federal government employees. 
As I1 is defined as the expected out-of-pocket expense for medical 
care for a family, low values of the measure suggest extensive health 
insurance coverage and high values indicate little coverage. Zero cor-
responds to full insurance coverage. For a given insurance policy, I1 
increases as the family's predicted loss increases.4 Similarly, for a 
given expected loss, I1 decreases as the individual's policy provides 
4 If the policy has a stop-loss, an increase in loss above the stop-loss will not change 
this measure of insurance coverage. 
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greater coverage of the 10ss.5 A policy may provide greater coverage 
of a loss through a variety of policy provisions such as a lower 
deductible, less coinsurance, higher limits, or a broader definition of 
covered losses. 
2.2 Expected Indemnity Benefits From Insurance (/2) 
This measure of insurance, 12, is used by Browne (1989) in his 
study of adverse selection in the individual health insurance market. 
Following Browne, this measure is defined as: 
that is, 12i is the expected indemnity benefit from the insurance pol-
icy owned by insured i. The size of the expected benefit depends on 
the expected medical expense of insured i and the provisions of the 
insurance policy owned by insured i. 
12 is similar to the pure (or net) premium of a single insurance 
policy. The pure premium is the portion of the insurance premium 
charged on behalf of the insured to cover the anticipated cost of 
claims. 12 is the expected value of benefits for an insured with a par-
ticular insurance policy and a particular set of risk characteristics. It 
must be pointed out that 12 differs from the pure premium of the 
insured's insurance policy both to the extent that the loss prediction 
algorithm used in this paper differs from that used by insurance com-
pany actuaries and to the extent that the data in this study differ 
from that used by insurers in establishing rates. 
12 will increase as expected losses increase for any given individ-
ual or family insurance policy. Likewise, the value of 12 will 
increase with the depth of coverage for an expected loss of a given 
amount. Because this measure takes into account the risk characteris-
tics of the insured as well as the insurance policy provisions, it incor-
porates more information than simply the limits of coverage. It is a 
more appealing measure of insurance than Il, as it represents how 
much insurance the policy provides rather than how little. 
5 For instance, suppose a family's expected medical expense is $250. This family will 
have more insurance by measure 11 if the policy has a $100 deductible than if the pol-
icy has a $200 deductible. Applying the plan's benefit formula to the family's 
expected medical expense yields 11 = $100 if the policy has a $100 deductible. I1 = 
$200 if the policy has a $200 deductible. 
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2.3 Expected Out-ot-Pocket Payments/Expected Losses 
(/3) 
The third measure of insurance, 13, is the ratio of the insured's 
expected out-of-pocket payments for medical services to the total cost 
of the medical services, that is, for insured i, 
Clearly 13i ranges in value from zero to one. Zero corresponds to full 
insurance and one to no insurance. 
This measure of insurance differs from the coinsurance percentages 
that are stated in insurance policies. Stipulated policy coinsurance 
percentages apply to actual losses and may vary by the type of loss. 
For instance, the policy may stipulate one coinsurance percentage for 
prescription drugs and another for ambulatory surgery. 
Because measure 13 is the fraction of the expected loss retained 
by the insured, it is similar to an aggregate coinsurance percentage. 
Here the aggregate coinsurance percentage is defined as the portion 
of total medical expenses that will be paid by the insured rather 
than by the insurer. 
One factor that makes 13 an ambiguous measure in certain situa-
tions is that it does not increase monotonically with the size of the 
expected loss. An example illustrates the problem. Consider the fol-
lowing situation. An insured has an insurance policy with the follow-
ing provisions: 
Deductible 
Coinsurance -
Limit 
$1,000 
Insurer pays 80 percent of loss amount above 
$1,000 and below $5,000. The insurer pays 100 per-
cent of loss amounts between $5,000 and $10,000. 
There is no insurance coverage for loss amounts in 
excess of $10,000. 
Let L be the actual loss incurred and B be the actual indemnity 
benefit; then: 
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o if L .$" 1,000 
0.8 (L - 1,000) if 1,000 .$" L .$" 5,000 
3,200 + (L - 5,000) if 5,000 .$" L .$" 10,000 
8,200 if L ~ 10,000. 
The aggregate coinsurance percentage, a(agg), is given by 
i.e., 
L-B B 
a(agg) = -L- = 1-[ 
a(agg) = 
1 if 0 .$" L .$" 1,000 
800 
0.2 + T if 1,000 .$" L .$" 5,000 
1,800 
L if 5,000 .$" L .$" 10,000 
1 - 8,~00 if L ~ 10,000. 
In this case, 13 is of the same form as a(agg), but with L replaced by 
E[L]. The graph below shows how measure 13 varies as the expected 
loss increases. Note that insurance coverage ends at $10,000. Beyond 
$10,000, 13 increases asymptotically to 1.00. 
Suppose two persons have the individual policy described above, 
but they have different expected losses. Individual A has an 
expected loss of LA = $2,667 while individual B has an expected loss 
of LB = $16,400 such that they have the same value of 13 (0.5). Does 
this mean that they have the same level of insurance? 13 cannot dis-
tinguish these two cases. Further, if another individual, C, also pur-
chases the same policy but has expected losses of Lc = $6,000 such 
that the value of 13 is 0.3. This implies that C had less coverage 
than A, which is not true. 
13, however, does not suffer this problem if the policy provides 
unlimited coverage or if expected losses do not exceed the limits of 
the policy. 
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The Influence of the Expected Loss Amount on 13 
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2.4 The Insurance Premium (/4) 
The fourth measure of insurance, 14, is the premium paid for 
insurance coverage by or on behalf of the insured. This measure of 
insurance has been used widely by insurance researchers (for example 
Farley and Wilensky (1983) and Beenstalk et al. (1988)). An advan-
tage of this measure is that it is relatively easy to obtain and does 
not require as much information to calculate as the prior three mea-
sures. 
In a competitive insurance market the premium not only includes 
expected losses, but also includes a loading for the company's 
expenses, profits, and investment income. In a market that is not com-
petitive, insurers may earn excess profits that would be included in 
the premium. Because the level of company expenses, interest earn-
ings, and any excess profits do not change the amount of insurance a 
policy is contractually obligated to provide, but do affect the size of 
the premium, this is not a perfect measure of insurance. For instance, 
if a company is able to exercise monopoly power in one state but not 
another, it may charge more for an identical policy in the state 
where it exercises monopoly power than for the policy in the state 
79 
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where it does not exercise monopoly power.6 The company is not pro-
viding any more protection in the state where it charges more than in 
the state where it charges less. In addition, an insurance policy pre-
mium may be an inaccurate measure of coverage if market premium 
rates lag changes in underlying medical expenses. 
2.5 Limit of Coverage (/5) 
The fifth measure of insurance, IS, is the limit of coverage speci-
fied in the insurance policy agreement. This measure of insurance is 
used by Phelps (1973). The limit of insurance specified in the insur-
ance policy agreement is a characteristic of the insurance agreement 
and does not reflect the risk characteristics of the insured explicitly. 
Insurance policies often have more than one limit. Among the differ-
ent limits that may be used as a measure of the coverage a health 
insurance policy provides are the number of hospital days covered 
and the maximum payment for a surgical procedure. The limit used in 
this paper is the lifetime maximum dollar limit of total benefits 
provided by the insurance policy. 
IS is defined here as the maximum amount of insurance protection 
that a policy will provide. The measure does not account for the dif-
ferences in risk exposure inherent to different insureds. The measure 
also may give an imprecise indication of the amount of insurance a 
policy provides because it focuses exclusively on one policy provision 
to the exclusion of all others. Further, it is unlikely that an insured 
will reach the policy limit. With IS, two insurance policies with the 
same limit but different deductibles would not be distinguishable. 
2.6 A Comparison of the Measures of Insurance 
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and max-
imum insurance coverage for the 1977-78 sample population used in 
this study, employing the five measures of insurance? 
A procedure developed by Duan et ai. (1983) was modified to pre-
dict medical expenses. Insurance policy provisions of the insureds in 
the sample are applied to the predicted losses to determine the 
value of insurance company indemnity benefits and the amount of the 
loss that is borne by the insured. Predicted expenses and insurance 
6 There is little evidence that health insurers currently exercise monopoly power in the 
U.s. Further, health insurers' profitability is limited in many states by minimum loss 
ratio requirements. 
7 The average medical care cost for an individual for 1994 is roughly $2500. 
80 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.2, 1993 
indemnity benefits are summed across family members to determine 
totals for families. Ex ante predicted values for the random variables 
Il,12, and 13 then were constructed. 
In the Duan et al. study, aggregate medical expenses were pre-
dicted. In the current study, losses are predicted for each person in 
the sample for each of six types of medical expenses: outpatient 
physician fees, inpatient surgeon fees, inpatient physician 
(nons urge on) fees, hospital room and board charges, fees for diagnos-
tic tests, and prescription medicine expenses. Health insurance poli-
cies typically have different coverage provisions for different types 
of losses. The number of medical services for which loss amounts were 
predicted was limited by the availability of medical insurance data 
in the National Medical Care Expenditures Survey. The survey provides 
extensive insurance coverage information for the medical services 
used in the study but not for all medical services. 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Measures of Insurance 
Based on 1977-78 Data 
Measure 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mean 
236.94 
417.99 
0.41 
1012.95 
262,967.68 
Standard Deviation 
210.47 
450.58 
0.27 
660.90 
315,505.27 
11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care 
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance 
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses 
14: Insurance premium 
15: Limit of coverage 
Minimum 
o 
o 
o 
21.0 
1,000.00 
Maximum 
2052.20 
5546.10 
1.00 
5798.20 
5,000,000.00 
A simple example illustrates how the different measures of 
insurance coverage can conflict. Consider two families, one in good 
health, the other in poor health. The two families have almost 
identical insurance policies that cover all medical expenses after a 
deductible. The deductible on the policy held by the healthy family 
is $50. The family that is in poor health has a policy with a $100 
deductible. Expected losses are $75 for the healthy family and 
$1,000 for the less healthy family. Suppose the insurance premium 
charged on behalf of each family is 120 percent of its expected loss. 
The expected loss is assumed to be known by the insurer. Measure I1 
for the healthy family is $50 and $100 for the less healthy family. 
With I1 as the measure of insurance, the healthy family has more 
insurance than the less healthy family because I1 is less. A cursory 
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examination of the policies would lead to the same conclusion, as the 
healthy family's policy is identical in all regards to that of the less 
healthy family except that it has a lower deductible. 
Now consider how these families compare by the other measures 
of insurance. If measure 12 is considered as the appropriate measure 
of insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the 
healthy family has. The expected insurance indemnity benefit for 
the healthy family is $25, whereas for the less healthy family the 
expected benefit is $900. By measure 13, the percent of the total 
expected losses covered by insurance, the less healthy family has 
more insurance than the healthy family. The insurer will pay 90 
percent of the less healthy family's medical expenses, but only 33 
percent of the healthy family's losses. With 14 as the measure of 
insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the 
healthy family. Recall that premiums are assumed to be 120 percent 
of expected medical expenses for both families and the expected med-
ical expense of the less healthy family is greater than that of the 
healthy family. Finally, with IS as the measure of insurance, both 
families have an equal amount of insurance because both have a pol-
icy that provides unlimited coverage above the deductible. A sum-
mary of the example is provided in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
An Illustrative Example of the Insurance Measures 
Policy Provisions Healthy Family 
Deductible 
Expected Losses 
Limit of Coverage 
Measures of Coverage 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care 
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance 
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses 
14: Insurance premium 
15: Limit of coverage 
$50 
$75 
Unlimited 
$50 
$25 
67% 
$90 
Unlimited 
Sickly Family 
$100 
$1,000 
Unlimited 
$100 
$900 
10% 
$1,200 
Unlimited 
3 The Medical Expense Insurance Demand Model 
This section of the paper specifies and estimates medical expense 
insurance demand equations for each of the five measures of insur-
ance. 
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3.1 Specification of the Demand Model 
For any of the measures of insurance (1) defined above, it is 
assumed that the medical expense insurance demand equation can be 
written, for family t, as: 
t = 1,2, ... , N. 
Here Xli is a column vector of explanatory variables pertaining to 
the demographic characteristics of the family believed to affect the 
demand for insurance, and X2t is a vector of explanatory variables 
pertaining to the employment group through which the family 
obtains insurance coverage. Recall that the insurance demand equa-
tions are estimated with group market data. /31 and /32 are vectors of 
estimated coefficients corresponding to Xl and X2, respectively. The 
model's error term, et, is assumed to be normally distributed.8 
The family's demographic variables in the insurance demand 
equation include its perceived health status, age of the head of 
household, sex of the head of household, marital status, level of 
education of the head of household, race of the head of household, 
family income from all sources, family size, and region of the country. 
The group characteristic variables include group size9 and the share 
of the insurance premium paid by the employer. 
The family'S perceived health status is hypothesized to be corre-
lated to the amount of insurance purchased. Theoretical studies of 
the demand for insurance in a market with adverse selection support 
this hypothesis (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). 
Phelps (1973) as well as others have found that age is correlated 
positively with the amount of medical insurance purchased. One pos-
sible explanation for this correlation is that as one ages the variance 
of losses increases, as does the average expected loss size. 
The variable, female, has a value of one if the head of house-
hold is a female and a zero if a male. Prior studies have shown that 
families headed by females typically have less medical insurance 
than families headed by males (Farley and Wilensky, 1983). 
Marital status is believed to be correlated positively with insur-
ance purchases. Because medical expense insurance often is offered as 
an employee benefit extending to other members of the immediate 
8 A log transformation of the insurance measure was used in all but the 13 models. In 
that model the log-odds transformation was used. 
9 Group size is the size of the employment group through which the individual 
acquires insurance coverage. 
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family, the assumption is made that a married individual will be 
more likely to have medical expense insurance coverage. 
Education is hypothesized to be correlated positively with insur-
ance consumption. Grossman's (1972) model of health care consumption 
assumes that consumption of health care services increases one's stock 
of human capital. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of human 
capital will have a greater demand for medical insurance. 
Four indicator variables are used to classify by race: black, 
Hispanic, white, and other. Because these indicator variables must 
sum to one, one must be omitted from the model. White is the omitted 
variable in the model. Studies of medical expense insurance consump-
tion by race have shown that whites are the greatest consumers of 
medical expense insurance. 
Phelps (1973) finds that income is correlated positively with 
insurance purchases. As insurance is not a necessity, the indigent may 
choose not to purchase it. As income increases, insurance becomes rela-
tively more affordable. In addition the tax advantage to purchasing 
group medical expense insurance is related positively to income. This 
encourages a greater demand for insurance at higher income levels. A 
priori, the effect of income on the consumption of insurance is not 
clear, however. This is because those with higher incomes are more 
capable of self-insuring than the poor. For a risk neutral person, self-
insuring may be preferable to purchasing insurance because of the 
expenses associated with writing insurance. Due to the extreme losses 
possible, self insurance usually is not opted for by persons who need to 
protect their assets. 
Nine indicator variables are used to classify insureds by region of 
the country. These regions of the country are classified according to 
the 1970 U.S. census. Eight of the variables are included as depen-
dent variables in the insurance demand equation. The ninth variable 
which represents the Pacific region is the omitted variable. These 
variables are included to account for regional variations in the por-
tion of the population with medical expense insurance. They also 
account for the variation in the supply of medical care by region. 
Five indicator variables are used to represent the area in which 
the insured lives. The first includes the 16 largest standard 
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). The second includes all 
SMSAs (with the exception of the largest 16) that have a population 
greater than 500,000. The third area consists of all SMSAs with a 
population less than 500,000. The fourth includes areas that are not 
SMSAs but that are less than 60 percent rural. The fifth includes 
areas that are more than 60 percent rural. The first area variable, 
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations For Insurance Demand Equation 
Inde~endent and Omitted Variables 
Independent Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Educat Years of education 12.26 3.18 
Lfaminc* Log of family income 21,342.21 16,554.88 
Age Age in years 39.93 12.26 
Female 1 if female 0.17 0.37 
Married 1 if married 0.71 0.45 
Area2 1 if SMSA > 500,000 0.25 0.43 
Area3 1 if SMSA < 500,000 0.19 0.39 
Area4 1 if not SMSA but < 60% rural 0.20 0.40 
Area5 1 if not SMSA, rural 0.13 0.33 
Black 1 if Black 0.09 0.29 
Hisp 1 if Hispanic 0.04 0.19 
Other 1 if not black, His~anic, or white 0.02 0.12 
Hunk 1 if occupation un nown 0.10 0.30 
Hmrg 1 if occupation managerial 0.10 0.31 
Hsales 1 if occupational sales 0.05 0.21 
Hclerk 1 if occupational clerk 0.07 0.22 
Hcrafts 1 if occupational crafts 0.16 0.37 
Hoper 1 if occupational operator 0.13 0.34 
Htrans 1 if occupation transportation 0.05 0.23 
Hservv 1 if occupation service 0.09 0.29 
Hlabor 1 if occupation labor 0.05 0.22 
Hfown 1 if occupation farm owner 0.01 0.10 
Hflabor 1 if occupation farm laborer 0.Q1 0.07 
Physgood 1 if perceived health status good 0.39 0.49 
Phsfair 1 if perceived health status fair 0.10 0.30 
Phspoor 1 if perceived health status poor 0.02 0.14 
Limmag 1 if major activity limitation 0.02 0.12 
Limmat 1 if amount activity limitation 0.03 0.17 
Limmin 1 if minor activity limitation 0.02 0.15 
Neweng 1 if in corresponding 1 ~70 census region 0.04 0.20 
Midatl 0.16 0.37 
Encent 0.22 0.42 
Wncent 0.08 0.27 
Ssatl 0.20 0.40 
Seast 0.06 0.23 
Swest 0.07 0.25 
Mnt 0.03 0.18 
Lfamsize Log of family size 3.17 1.67 
Groupszp Group size 20,342.88 71,180.67 
Esharec Employers share of the premium 0.74 0.32 
Omitted Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Male Male 0.83 0.37 
Area1 Largest 16 SMSAs 0.24 0.42 
White White 0.86 0.35 
Phsexl Perceived health status excellent 0.50 0.50 
Limmon No activity limitation 0.93 0.25 
Pacific Pacific census region 0.14 0.35 
Nmarried 1 if not married 0.29 0.45 
Hprof Occupational professional 0.18 0.38 
Absolute values not log values are reported in this table. The logs of the specified variables are 
used in the regression 
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representing the 16 largest SMSAs, is the omitted variable in the 
model. 
Two firm-specific explanatory variables are used in the model: 
group size and the share of the insurance premium paid on behalf of 
the insured family by the employer. Group size is assumed to be a 
proxy for the price of insurance because group insurance can be pro-
vided more cheaply per person to members of larger groups. Thus, a 
positive correlation is hypothesized between group size and insurance 
purchases. A positive correlation also is hypothesized between the 
employer's share of the premium and the consumption of medical 
expense insurance. For a given insurance premium, the family's out-of-
pocket cost drops as the employer's share of the premium increases. 
Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation of the indepen-
dent and omitted variables. 
3.2 Estimation of the Demand Model 
Table 4 reports the estimated medical insurance demand equa-
tions using each of the five different measures of insurance. 
Parameter estimates and tests of their significance differ markedly 
across equations. Of the five equations the R2 value is highest for 
the I2 equation, expected insurance indemnity benefits. 
Because the insurance policy premium has been used as the mea-
sure of insurance in most previous studies of insurance demand, the 
demand model estimated with measure I4 serves as a benchmark for 
comparison with other insurance demand models. The R2 value of 0.24 
falls within the range of values of other models using this measure; 
the R 2 value of the Farley and Wilensky model is 0.20, and that of 
the Phelps model is 0.39. The estimated income elasticity of 0.18 
falls within the range of previously estimated income elasticities for 
a medical expense insurance demand model.10 As hypothesized, the 
coefficient estimates for the perceived health status variables are 
correlated highly with the insurance premium, as is family income. 
Families with a female head of household are less well insured in 
general than those with a male head of household. The insurance 
premium is related positively with family size and marital status, 
as hypothesized. 
The age of the head of household is not significant in the 
demand equation. This may be attributable to the sample population 
being limited to individuals under the age of 65. In addition, the 
10 Holmer (1984) provides a discussion of the variation in estimated income elastici-
ties. Phelps estimated an elasticity of 0.18, while Hoy estimated an elasticity of 0.02. 
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c.... TABLE 4 0 
c Insurance Demand Equations .... 
:::I 
~ Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables) ~ 
» 11 (R2=.33) 12(R2=.39) 13*(R2=.06) 14(R2=.24) 15(R2=.07) $l c Independent parameter parameter parameter parameter parameter ~ Variable estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat ~ 
"'U Intercept 3.719 13.135 2.409 6.645 2.466 1.614 4.541 20.336 283032.720 2.566 il1 Educat -2.22E-11 -0.330 -0.004 -0.498 -0.004 -0.111 -0.006 -1.063 4633.133 1.769 $l o· LFaminc 0.055 1.961 0.064 1.780 0.061 0.401 0.18 8.283 16883.677 1.545 CD Age 0.014 9.638 0.030 15.540 -0.027 -3.362 0.003 2.405 -639.923 -1.106 Female 0.164 2.659 0.003 0.041 0.222 0.667 -0.205 -4.210 -9618.366 -0.400 Married 0.531 9.664 0.410 5.822 0.376 1.268 0.207 4.755 -12590.869 -0.588 (Xl Area2 -0.111 -2.090 -0.114 -1.678 -0.177 -0.617 -0.023 -0.555 41224.128 1.989 ~ Area3 
-0.217 -4.106 0.092 1.362 
-0.801 -2.805 0.024 0.584 15951.835 0.773 Area4 -0.253 -4.601 0.034 0.481 -0.812 -2.732 -0.031 -0.709 3269.112 0.152 Area5 
-0.177 -2.783 0.018 0.223 -0.504 -1.468 -0.0074 -1.478 -21039.910 -0.847 Black 
-0.050 -0.788 0.128 1.577 -0.133 -1.468 0.011 0.222 24025.036 0.962 Hisp 
-0.226 -2.149 
-0.306 -2.277 0.264 0.466 0.102 1.228 16399.984 0.401 Other -0.171 -1.184 0.682 3.697 -1.263 -1.625 -0.105 -0.921 82126.742 1.463 Hunk -0.126 -1.765 0.032 0.348 -0.186 -0.486 0.018 0.325 -42520.428 -1.534 Hmgr 0.087 1.344 0.183 2.224 -0.624 -1.798 -0.099 -1.942 16277.970 0.649 Hsales 0.219 2.558 0.006 0.055 -0.111 -0.241 0.046 0.674 -20834.308 -0.624 < ~ Hclerk 0.103 1.299 0.145 1.429 -0.483 -1.131 0.112 1.794 18116.812 0.588 ...... 
-
Hcrafts -0.022 -0.344 0.248 3.038 -0.767 -2.227 0.056 1.118 -20185.188 -0.812 Z Hoper 0.103 1.493 0.276 3.120 -0.683 -1.835 0.003 0.055 -56753.308 -2.110 s:> Htrans 0.015 0.180 0.122 1.123 -0.525 -1.144 -0.004 -0.055 -12431.312 -0.375 I\) 
...... 
Hserv -0.029 -0.413 -.373 4.135 -0.949 -2.497 0.036 0.651 -5915.009 -0.829 <0 
<0 
c.v 
TABLE 4 (cont.) $: Ql 
Insurance Demand Equations 
* ~
Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables) OJ 
a 
11 (R2=.33) 12(R2=.39) 13*(R2=.06) 14(R2=.24) 15(R2=.07) ::E ::l 
Independent parameter parameter parameter parameter parameter (J) 
Variable estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Hlabor 0.063 0.706 0.029 0.253 -0.324 -0.674 0.030 0.434 -25829.668 -0.744 
Hfown -0.377 -1.892 -0.452 -1.769 -0.640 -0.595 0.117 0.746 83648.331 1.076 
Hflabor 0.226 0.977 0.544 1.841 -0.813 -0.654 0.005 0.028 -36384.059 -0.404 
Phsgood 0.292 8.126 0.259 5.636 -0.196 -1.011 -0.060 -2.110 1464.722 0.105 
Phsfair 0.431 7.227 0.683 8.943 -0.762 -2.370 -0.058 -1.231 -16969.680 0.326 
Phspoor 0.810 6.359 1.087 6.666 -0.837 -1.219 -0.044 -0.438 16195.869 0.326 
(X) Limmaj 0.817 5.589 0.832 4.443 1.331 1.688 -0.190 -1.644 -24068.161 -0.422 
(X) Limmamt 0.420 4.259 0.938 7.436 -0.512 -0.963 -0.022 -0.280 2346.205 0.061 
Limmin 0.462 4.274 0.169 1.226 0.231 0.397 -0.014 -0.170 -374.051 -0.009 
Neweng -0.145 -1.638 0.799 7.022 -1.390 -2.899 0.044 0.629 -64783.774 -1.870 
Midatl -0.252 -3.762 0.637 7.431 -1.176 -3.259 -0.055 -1.034 -1 06592.340 -4.088 
Encent -0.270 -4.451 0.558 7.198 -1.227 -3.755 0.055 1.155 -8516.062 -0.361 
Wncent -0.033 -0.456 0.493 5.245 -0.910 -2.297 0.054 0.927 -24259.950 -0.847 
Ssatl -0.018 -0.276 0.267 3.288 -0.209 -0.613 -0.143 -2.853 -5314.145 -2.153 
Seast -0.208 -2.356 0.021 0.188 0.103 0.215 -0.121 -1.735 -78952.442 -2.292 
Swest 0.442 5.755 -0.320 -3.254 1.032 2.488 -0.135 -2.232 -52285.950 -1.746 0 ~ 
Mnt 0.100 0.988 -0.185 -1.427 0.940 1.719 0.049 0.618 10549.781 -0.267 2: 
Lfamsize 0.117 3.102 0.065 1.351 0.154 0.761 0.157 5.294 -33362.649 -2.279 ::l <0 
Groupszp -0.014 -2.193 0.029 3.515 -0.080 -2.261 0.015 3.003 -14907.440 -5.849 ::l 
Esharec -0.154 -2.767 0.145 2.034 -0.586 -1.955 0.050 1.139 -44027.015 -2.034 en c 
til 
*The log-odds transformation was used to normalize the dependent variable ::l () (J) 
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effect of age may be diluted because the ages of other individuals in 
the family are not accounted for in the demand equation. 
Both of the group characteristic explanatory variables are signif-
icant and exhibit the hypothesized relationship with the dependent 
variable. A positive relationship between group size and insurance 
consumption was hypothesized and is supported by the data. The 
size of the employer portion of the insurance premium is related posi-
tively to the level of insurance purchase, as hypothesized. 
The demand equations estimated using insurance measures I1 and 
I2 exhibit the highest R2 values of the five models. The measures 
are related to one another by the equation: 
12 = Expected Medical Expenses - I1 
Measure I1 is a measure of the lack of insurance coverage a fam-
ily has, as it measures the family's expected out-of-pocket payments 
for medical care. The interpretation of the coefficients of the demand 
model estimated with I1 are therefore counter to that of the other 
demand models in most instances. 
I1 is correlated positively with the perceived health status of 
the family, as is 12. Those who perceive their health to be worse 
demand more health insurance. The estimated coefficient for age is 
statistically significant in both equations. As the age of the head of 
household increases, the expected out-of-pocket payments for medical 
care increase. In the 12 equation the relationship is positive, indicat-
ing that the expected insurance benefits increase as the age of the 
family head increases. The marital status variable is positive and 
statistically significant in the I1 and 12 equations. 
The group characteristic variables are both negative and both 
significant in the I1 equation. In the 12 equation they are both posi-
tive and both significant. The group characteristic variables of both 
equations provide strong evidence that the depth of insurance cover-
age increases with group size and with the share of the premium 
paid by the employer. 
The remaining two demand equations, 13 and IS, have low R2 
values for medical expense insurance demand equations. These mea-
sures theoretically are not superior to those previously discussed, and 
they do not have superior explanatory power empirically. 
4 Conclusion 
Several different measures of insurance have been used by 
researchers in previous studies of medical insurance demand to quan-
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tify a family's level of insurance coverage. This paper compares five 
different measures of insurance coverage using the National Medical 
Care Expenditure Survey data. 
Insurance demand equations using the different measures of insur-
ance as the dependent variable differ significantly from one another. 
The 12 equation ranks first in terms of variation explained by tradi-
tional medical insurance demand variables. Insurance demand equa-
tions utilizing measures 13 and IS rank lowest. Explanatory variables 
found to be significantly related to insurance consumption in several 
of the equations include age, sex of the head of household, family 
size, income, perceived health status, and marital status.1 1 
The information on health insurance demand provided by this 
research shows that the amount of health insurance persons desire 
varies greatly depending on demographic characteristics such as age, 
sex, and marital status. Income and the health of the family, prox-
ied by predicted medical expenses, are also important determinants 
of the amount of insurance a family purchases. Although the leading 
proposals for health care reform call for community rating and uni-
versal coverage, there will likely be a sizable market for supplemen-
tal insurance after reform. This study provides valuable information 
on those groups that have a high demand for health insurance. In a 
postreform environment, the same groups likely will have the great-
est demand for supplemental health insurance. 
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